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 The title of my dissertation – “Material Tensions between Natural Law 
and Positive Law and Approaches to its Solution” – refers to everlasting 
contrapositions of two different approaches to law: (i) natural law tradition 
which is concerned with a necessary continuity between law and the 
requirements of practical reasonableness and that describes law as “rational 
standard for conduct”
1
 and  (ii) tradition of legal positivism, which 
understands law only as a social fact. 
Actually, in the world of jurisprudence, there is no single natural law 
theory on one side
2
 and unique legal positivism on the other side.
3
 It is 
                                               
1 MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Jurisprudence. Legal Theory. 2003, No. 9, p. 244, 
MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Theory. In: GOLDING , Martin P., EDMUNSON, William A. 
(eds.). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. s.l. : Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006, p. 15. 
2 For many of them we can mention classical natural law theory of the thomistic 
philosophy, new natural law theory of G. Grisez and J. Finnes, legal realism of J. Hervada, 
“modern” natural law theories such as L. Fuller’s concept of the Rule of Law and the inner 
morality of law or R. Dworkin’s theory of the unique right answer based on legal 
principles. Cf. FINNIS, John. Natural Law : The Classical Tradition. In: COLEMAN, Jules, 
SHAPIRO, Scott (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. 
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 1–60 and BIX, Brian H. Natural Law : The 
Modern Tradition. In: COLEMAN, Jules, SHAPIRO, Scott (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 61–103. 
In continental jurisprudence we can find different natural law approaches of G. Radbruch, 
S. Kafuman, M. Kriele, R. Dreier, A. Verdross and R. Alexy. Cf. HOLLÄNDER, Pavel. 
Filosofie práva. Plzeň : Aleš Čeněk, 2006, p. 18. 
3 In Czech jurisprudence many theories of legal positivistic tradition were  described at 
large in works of T. Sobek. Cf. SOBEK, Tomáš. Argumenty teorie práva. Praha : Ústav státu 
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better to speak about different theories in the frame of the tradition of legal 
positivism or in the frame of the tradition of natural law thinking.
4
  
For this reason, the dissertation does not offer any general theory of 
“positivism–natural law” tensions and limits itself to presentation of two 
important theories of naturalistic tradition: New Natural Law theory of John 
Finnis and legal theory of Robert Alexy.  
New Natural Law theory (sometimes also called the New Classical 
Natural Law theory) is based on new interpretation of Aquinas, which was 
introduced by G. Grisez in 1965
5
 and for the jurisprudence revealed by J. 
Finnis.
6
 This theory understands natural law thinking as “reflective critical 
accounts of the constitutive aspects of the well-being and fulfillment of 
human persons and the communities they form”.
7
 The distinctive areas of 
interest of the New Natural Law theory are not only jurisprudential topics, 
but also the foundations of moral thought and practical reason (and practical 
reasonableness), the nature of human actions, the nature of political 
authority, the political common good or the ultimate end of human beings.
8
 
The dissertation presents two key jurisprudential topics resolved by the 
New Natural Law: derivation of positive law and lex iniusta non est lex 
thesis. The New Natural Law theory states that positive law is derived from 
                                                                                                                       
a práva, 2008, SOBEK, Tomáš. Nemorální právo. Praha : Ústav státu a práva, 2010 and 
SOBEK, Tomáš. Právní myšlení. Kritika moralismu. Praha : Ústav státu a práva, 2011. 
4 Cf. RAZ, Joseph. The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality. 2nd ed. Oxford 
: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 319. 
5 Cf. GRISEZ, Germain G. The First Principal of Practical Reason: A Commentary on 
the Summa Theologiae, 1–2, Question 94, Article 2. Natural Law Forum. 1965, vol. 10, p. 
168–201. 
6 FINNIS, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
1980. 
7 GEORGE, Robert P. Natural Law. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. 2008, 
vol. 31, no. 1, p. 172. 
8 TOLLEFSEN, Christopher. The New Natural Law Theory. Lyceum. Vol. X, no. 1, p. 1. 
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natural law in two different types of derivation corresponding to different 
types of law: direct (deductive) “translation” and indirect determinatio.
9
  
Regarding lex iniusta we present weak reading based on Finnis’s focal 
sense of law.
10
 According to Finnis to say that unjust laws are not laws at all 
is self-contradictory statement. The lex iniusta thesis only says, that some 
law is law in the focal sense, whereas some law (unjust law) is law in a 
secondary, peripheral sense.
11
 Although it seems that such a statement could 
be compatible with legal positivism, we do not agree. At least, the weak 
natural law thesis is contrary to the spirit of legal positivism: “For if the 
weak natural thesis is true, it follows that one cannot have a complete 
descriptive theory of law without having a complete understanding of the 
requirements of practical reasonableness.”
12
 
Robert Alexy is a representative of “modern” natural law thinking. He 
describes himself as inclusive non-positivist.
13
 He defends thesis, that law 
has two dimensions – real and ideal – and follows Radbruch formula
14
 in 
stating that “extreme injustice is no law” (so called “argument from 
injustice”).
15
 His concept of law also contains the “argument from 
correctness”, which says that law claims to be morally correct, and 
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“argument from principles”, which holds that all legal systems necessarily 
comprise legal principles. Those three arguments form basis of his criticism 
of legal positivism. 
We present Alexy’s theory on the background of his polemic with 
Joseph Raz. The Raz–Alexy discussion is unique: the proponents of the 
discussion comes from different legal cultures. 
The dissertation also deals with human rights and represents attitudes of 
R. Alexy and New Natural Law to this topic. Although the idea of human 
rights seems to be widely shared, there are many contradictory approaches 
to them. Alexy defends human rights as moral elements which are universal, 
fundamental, abstract and have priority over all other norms. He defends its 
objectivity and justifiability which is based on “explicative-existential” 
argument which stems from his theory of legal discourse. Alexy explicitly 
rejects religious, intuitionistic, consensual, biological and instrumental  
approach to human rights. 
In last chapter we present consequences of natural law thinking on 
concrete social topic, which is religious neutrality of the state. We present 
argumentation based on New Natural Law theory which comes to the end, 
that although the state and religion should be in many ways separated and 
neutral, this does not forbid to the state some kind of promoting religion. 
 
 
